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  The  cement  industry  is  a  capital  intensive,  energy  consuming,  and  vital  industry  for  sustaining 
infrastructure  of  nations.  The  international  cement  market  –while  constituting  a  small  share  of  world  industry 
output—has been growing at an increasing rate relative to local production in recent years. Attempts to protect the 
environment in developed countries –especially Europe—have caused cement production plants to shift to countries 
with less stringent environmental regulations. Along with continually rising real prices, this has created a concerning 
pattern on economic efficiency and environmental compliance. 
This paper attempts to critically analyze the forces affecting pricing and production of cement from two 
perspectives. Porter’s five forces serve as our tool to analyze the competitive forces that move the industry from a 
market  economy  standpoint.  On  the  other  hand,  the  institutional  economics  framework  serves  to  explain  how 
governments and policymakers influence the structure and production distribution in the global market. Our findings 
suggest that the cement industry does not follow expected patterns of a market economy model. Additionally, it does 
not fully behave along the institutional economics paradigm. Hence, neither perspective explains the pricing or 
nature of the market on its own.  
Combining  market  forces  within  an  institutional  setting  provides  a  more  clear  understanding  of  price 
dynamics and industry performance. We find that local regulation alone is insufficient to ensure market efficiency 
due to weak institutional governance in developing countries aligned with private business interests of global cement 
firms. Moreover, the global impact of local environmental non-compliance generates economic spillover effects that 
cannot  be  corrected  by  market  forces  alone.  Due  to  asymmetries  in  governance  and  structure,  this  paper 
recommends the establishment of an independent international regulatory body for the cement industry that serves to 
provide sustainable industry development guidelines within a global context.  
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1. The Case of Cement: Local Production with Global Impact 
  The international cement market is one of the least regulated markets on an international 
scale whereas international cement trade has been growing intensively in recent decades. While 
the amount of cement traded has increased, the percentage of internationally traded cement to 
total cement production remains in single percent digits (5% to 7%). This means that most of 
cement production exists to satisfy local consumption. 
  The problem this research will explore is identifying the most critical factors required to 
regulate the growing market for international cement. Initial fact finding suggests that cement 
production  has  recently  been  concentrating  in  the  developing  world  (Miller,  2009).  Such 
increasing production of a capital-intensive (labor-saving) industry means that the impact the 
cement market is having on the local labor markets is low compared to the impact it is having on 
the capital market. Even though economic rents are considerable, cement is one of the most 
polluting industries: 5% of the world’s total emission of greenhouse gases is caused by cement 
production  (Loreti,  2008).  This  means  that  the  developing  world  is  increasingly  baring  the 
environmental burden. 
     Any  solution  suggested  to  the  problems  caused  by  the  cement  industry  has  to  be 
composed of three crucial elements. First, it must be implemented on an international scale. 
Local solutions cannot solve the problem.  The environmental impact of burning fuel necessary 
to produce cement in China, if uncontrolled, will lead to global warming because of the emission 
of greenhouse gases caused by the burning. The impact of global warming however is not limited 
to China alone but may have an extended impact on countries even as far away as South Africa. 
Second, the developed world has to create an incentives system that does not shift all production 
to areas that are less regulated. While it is desirable for European and North American countries 
to achieve green economies by closing down cement factories or enacting strict environmental 
regulations, it is a major problem when such cement production is only shifted to countries with 
looser environmental regulations (Miller, 2009). Third, corruption and hidden transaction costs 
within developing nations exacerbate the problem. Whether it is the lack of strong environmental 
regulations or weakly implemented competition laws, developing countries can be a haven for 
poor environmental control and strong cartels especially in a very high fixed cost industry such 
as cement (Mishkin, 2007 and Selim, 2009). Any solution that does not contain these three 
elements should be considered lacking. 
The growing production of cement calls on all countries and NGOs to begin seriously 
considering a global policy to solve the problems posed by this industry. An effective global 
policy can only be found if different actors cooperate. Being a capital-intensive industry that 
utilizes scarce resources to operate (such as fuel) means that governments need to keep some sort 
of an eye on production. Even though cement is locally produced the impact of the production is 
global and the presence of lucrative opportunities to shift production sites makes the industry an 
attractive  one  for  governmental  regulation.  It  is  this  interaction  between  the  economic (efficiency)  and the political  (institutional) that  calls  for  finding  a  framework  for  evaluating 
solutions that takes into account both ends. 
 
2. What is Cement? 
At the basic level cement is a binding substance that is intended for use in building or 
construction material and can withstand varying environmental conditions. The four elements 
necessary for its creation are iron, aluminum, silicon, and calcium. These elements are burned 
together in a kiln and are finely pulverized to create the powder and used as an ingredient of 
mortar and concrete we then call cement. This powder hardens once it is mixed with water but 
water does not break the bond once it is formed. About 75% of cement production is used in 
ready mixed concrete to be utilized in construction. The remaining 25% is used for paving roads 
or extracting oil (Portland Cement Association, 2009). 
The most common type of cement is Portland. This category is divided roughly into gray 
and white: gray is the most well known –most people refer to it when they say the word cement. 
White  is  the  aesthetic  alternative  of  gray  which  is  used  in  buildings  that  have  an  aesthetic 
component:  churches,  museums,  etc.  Gray  Portland  is  made  from  clinker  and  an  additional 
substance usually calcium sulfate. On the other hand, white Portland is made from limestone, 
kaolin, and gypsum. A less common type of Portland cement is referred to as Pozzolana Portland 
cement. It is used in buildings which expect to be exposed to constant high humidity or water 
and it is made out of clinker, gypsum, and natural pozzolana —a raw material of volcanic rocks 
and ash. Finally, there is a special type of cement utilized in extraction of oil and withstands high 
pressure areas called Oil-well cement (Cemex, 2010). While other types of cement exist, the 
most important are gray and white Portland cement as they comprise the bulk of cement utilized 
in constructing roads, buildings, and other structures. 
 
3. Major Country Players 
China leads the way in cement consumption and production around the world due to the 
large  scale  developments  and  infrastructure  buildup  projects  that  the  Chinese  government  is 
undertaking. According to 2007 estimates the Chinese production hovers around 50% of world 
total while the second closest rival –India—hovers around 6%. Table 1 details production of the 
top ten nations. In addition to showing the production in the years 2006 and 2007 in columns 2 
and 3, we have calculated in the fourth column the percent of market share of each country in the 
year 2007 by dividing the amount produced in each country by the world total. In column five, 
we calculate the percent increase in local production, whereas in column six we calculate the 
percent increase in world share (2006-2007). Some rounding errors are expected as the world 
total has been rounded. It is worthy to note that Thailand was very close to making it on the table 
as its production nears that of Brazil –and may exceed it in future years. Egypt on the other hand 











Table 1: Top 10 Producing Nations of Cement 















China  1,200,000  1,300,000  50%  8.3%  3.0% 
India  155,000  160,000  6%  3.2%  0% 
United States   99,700  96,400  3.9%  -3.3%  -0.2% 
Japan  69,900  70,000  2.6%  -0.14%  -0.1% 
Korea, 
Republic of  
55,000  55,000  2.1%   0%  -0.04% 
Russia  54,700  59,000  2.3%  7.9%  0.2% 
Spain  54,000  50,000  1.9%  -7.4%  -0.2% 
Turkey  47,500  48,000  1.8%  1.0%  -0.01% 
Mexico  40,600  41,000  1.5%  0.98%  -0.01% 
Brazil  39,500   40,000  1.5%  1.3%  -0.01% 
World Total   2,550,000  2,600,000       
Source: UN Comtrade (Steinweg, 2008), Production figures are in thousand metric tons 
 
Some of the slowdowns in production seen above are due to dramatic downward demand 
shifts  in  the  residential  housing  markets  of  the  United  States  and  Europe.  However,  public 
projects are keeping the total cement production around the world on the rise. It is interesting to 
note that production is concentrated in developing nations (at least 70% of world total production 
is based in developing countries). With the exception of the US, Japan, and Spain, all other 
nations in Table 1 are still in a developing phase. While the majority of the production is locally 
consumed, a good chunk of the cement produced is exported. This means that some production 
has shifted to these nations –whether it is because of cheaper labor, less strict environmental 
regulations, or subsidies (Mishkin, 2007 and Miller, 2009).   
 
4. Exporting Nations 
It  is  unsurprising  that  China  leads  the  way  in  this  category  since  Chinese  cement  
represents roughly 50% of world production. Below is a table detailing the total dollar value 
traded by the top ten nations along with the amount of cement traded. Half of those nations are 
not top producing nations. It is interesting to see that the exporting country list differs than the 
producing  country  list.  For  example,  the  United  States,  Russia  and  Spain  are  on  the  top 
producing list but not in the top 10 exporting countries. This is largely due to the fact that many 
of the producing nations utilize their cement for internal consumption within the growing local 
market. The third largest exporting nation also lies in Asia –Japan. This suggests that the Asian 
countries have a strong comparative advantage in producing cement (The Concrete Producer, 
2006). It is also surprising to see Canada on the exporting countries list –however it is probably 
due to its proximity to the United States which is the world’s largest importer. Hence, export 
markets  tend  to  be  regional  in  cement  trade,  but  with  significant  variance  in  country 
concentration relative to local production with the exception of China.  
 
Table 2: The Top 10 Cement Exporting Countries (in order of amount exported) 
Country  Value of Cement 
Exports  
Net Weight  
(in metric tons) 
Percentage export 
intensity (country 
export relative to total 
world exports) 
China  $1,180,621,971  36,129,658.562  37.9% 
Thailand  $520,744,807  14,980,341.699  15.7% 
Japan  $269,264,156  10,121,146.931  10.6% 
Germany  $521,101,000  7,286,091.431  7.6% 
Korea, Republic Of  $212,216,392  6,169,600.038  6.5% 
Canada  $331,560,586  5,007,076.024  5.2% 
India  $253,112,892  4,816,156.474  5% 
Turkey  $250,240,781  3,803,691.757  4% 
Malaysia  $137,963,081  3,721,707.074  3.9% 
Greece  $184,186,904  3,354,438.405  3.5% 
Source: UN Comtrade (Steinweg, 2008) 
Production figures are in metric tons, 2006 
 
The above shows how small the international market really is when compared with the 
total production of each country. In other words, highly producing countries do not necessarily 
have a high surplus. Exporting countries are the ones who have a surplus, but such a surplus is 
not indexed by their relative scale in local production. This is possibly due to the fact that they 
have a comparative advantage in producing cement via a lower cost of extracting raw materials 
(The Concrete Producer, 2006).   
 
5. Importing Nations 
The table below –Table 3—shows the dollar value of imported cement for the top ten 
countries  as  well  as  the  net  weight  (converted  from  kilograms  to  metric  tons)  of  cement 
imported. The United States leads the way in both aspects –though some slowdown is expected 
due to the financial turmoil in the housing market.  
This table is even more striking –the top 5 nations which consume about 55% of cement-- 
are all located in Western Europe and North America. From the export-import contrast one can 
see a trend of production in developing nations towards consumption in developed nations. The 
only exception to this rule is Korea which appears in both the import and export list. This is 
probably due to the fact that cement does not only refer to ready made powder but may also refer 
to materials such as clinker –which Korea may be importing to produce the cement it ships out. 
The trend we see –producing in developing nations for the use of developed nations-- can be 
mainly attributed to environmental regulations in the EU which appear to send the production to 
third world nations but the final product back to Europe. Additionally, due to the increasing cost 
of  European  cement  production  it  is  clear  that  cement  firms  have  chosen  to  move  their 
production sites to developing countries where labor cost is lower and production regulations are 
less stringent. 
  The United States is by far the number one importer of cement as it imports 3 times that 
of Spain –the second largest importer. This means that the shortage within the cement market in the US is very high and that national production does not supply the necessary demand. Other 
than Syria, no other country appearing on this list is from the Middle East region. The two tables 
–exporting and importing country lists— actually confirm that production and export is highly 
intensive  in  the  developing  world  with  lower  relative  demand,  while  consumption  mostly 
happens in the developed world with lower relative supply. Such a Ricardian notion in global 
cement  trade  necessitates  a  comparative  advantage  for  developing  countries  based  on  lower 
relative costs, with relaxed environmental regulations internalized within that cost. 
 
Table 3:  The Top 10 Cement Importing Countries (in order of total weight imported) 
Country  Value of Cement 
Imports 
Net Weight  





relative to world total) 
United States  $2,553,331,474  35,895,944.904  33.1% 
Spain  $737,121,284  12,356,397.091  11.4% 
Italy  $340,542,114  4,621,025.113  4.3% 
Netherlands  $250,292,002  3,873,054.182  3.6% 
France  $333,411,969  3,687,568.641  3.4% 
Korea, Republic Of  $141,625,690  3,260,128.876  3% 
Ghana  $163,413,617  3,230,817.192  3% 
Singapore  $127,909,094  2,986,054.476  2.8% 
Syria  $212,592,885  2,812,010.319  2.6% 
Kazakhstan  $165,412,275  2,610,647.332  2.4% 
Source: UN COM Trade 2006 (Steinweg, 2008) 
All Figures have been converted to metric tons 
   
6. Nature of the Market and Regional Pricing  
  The price of traded cement varies by country and region as multiple factors interplay.  
While we talk in more detail about pricing over a time period in subsequent sections, the purpose 
of this section is to provide a rough outline on pricing and to examine the critical regional pricing 
factors of the cement market. 
For the purpose of simplifying the analysis we have assumed that dividing the dollar 
value of cement exported by the amount of cement exported will yield the price per metric ton 
for that country’s cement. For example, dividing the dollar value of Chinese exports by their 
total  exports  and  doing  the  same  for  Thailand  yields  that  Chinese  cement  is  being  sold  for 
roughly $32 per metric ton while Thai cement is being sold for $34. Japanese and Korean cement 
are being sold  within the  same range  –the  former being  $27 and the  latter $34.  In contrast 
German cement runs for $71 a ton while Canadian cement runs for $66.  
From  a  regional  pricing  structure,  one  can  divide  cement  prices  into  two  regional 
categories: Asian cement on one hand and European and North American (EU/NA) on the other. 
It is somewhat disenchanting however to see that such cement prices are not reflected in the 
prices for which cement is actually sold in the market. In other words, the actual price of a ton of 
cement varies in a different way that can be analyzed by dividing the dollar amount paid by 
importing nations by the amount of cement traded for each nation. By doing so, we have found 
that the US pays an average of $71 per ton of cement while Singapore pays $42. Most European importers pay the same amount as the US –either due to high price of cement in neighboring 
countries or high price of transportation that is not usually included in the amount of money 
received by exporting nations. The average price of cement paid by importers is around $46 per 
metric ton. The average price of cement received by exporters is about $40. This means that 
about $6 per metric ton is being used for transportation, tariffs, or additional costs. 
From such a pricing variation it is evident that multiple factors, in addition to relative 
production cost, interplay together to determine the actual price of cement in the market – such 
as taxes, shipping costs, and institutional costs. Furthermore, it is clear that cement is a non-
homogeneous product in pricing. It is price differentiated by country of origin –subdivided into 
Asian and EU/NA. Korea still remains an interesting case as it exports and imports cement at 
differing prices. It imports it at a price of $43 per metric ton and exports it at a price of $34. 
While this may mislead us to assume that such prices mean that Korea probably imports finished 
products and exports raw materials, we must not forget that imported dollar values include tariffs 
paid to the country as well as transportation costs while exports do not include these values. 
Such a pricing structure shows that Asian countries have a strong comparative advantage. 
While Thailand for example has lower production scale compared to the US, it is able to become 
the world’s second largest exporter of cement because of a strong comparative advantage. Lower 
prices imply that the resources utilized for cement are utilized in the area where they are most 
needed. In other words, Asian countries can and are producing cement at a lower absolute cost 
and a lower opportunity cost to their nations. On the other hand, European nations are producing 
cement at substantially higher prices and costs. This cost differentiation is due to three factors. 
First, lower labor cost in Asian countries –European countries have a high minimum wage and 
stringent business/environmental regulations. Second, large subsidies from Asian governments. 
Third, comparatively low price of machinery in Asian countries.  
Even with high prices in European nations the demand for European cement is still very 
high. This can be due to one of two factors. First, the generally high demand for cement and the 
existence of a shortage. Second, the fact that neighboring countries are forced to buy cement 
from  areas  closest  to  them  to  avoid  high  shipping  costs.  Hence,  although  cement  is  a 
homogenous  product,  there  exists  cost  differentiation  in  the  global  cement  market  based  on 
Asian vs. EU/NA regional pricing.  
The  demand  for  cement  is  considered  to  be  price  inelastic  due  to  lack  of  apparent 
substitutes. This can be seen with varying degrees across the world today. As the economies of 
different countries are in recession and the construction business has been negatively impacted, 
cement prices persistently increased in real terms. In the UAE, for example, the price of cement 
has increased even though the real estate market is in turmoil. In Egypt, even though there has 
been  a reduction in  steel  prices in  2008-2009, cement prices  soared.  In North  America and 
Europe the prices are fluctuating but they are clearly on the rise (Portland Cement Association, 
2009). This can be attributed to the fact that even when private enterprise is not using cement, 
the governmental demand on it is high as it needs it for infrastructure build-up. What is more 
intriguing  is  that  while  the  cost  of  transportation  has  decreased  due  to  the  drop  in  oil  and 
subsequent fuel prices, the price of cement has actually increased in real terms. Such evidence 
only serves to reaffirm the necessity of cement and the high demand relative to the supply that 
can cause the industry to withstand severe economic slowdowns around the world. It also shows 
the ―resilience‖ of cement pricing to external shocks.  
 
 7. Environmental Impact 
  The process of producing cement causes negative environmental externalities at all levels 
of production. To make clinker and mix it to prepare concrete the material must be grounded and 
heated to more than 1500 
oC. Such energy intensive production releases NOX (nitrogen oxides), 
CO2 (carbon dioxide), and SO2 (sulfur dioxide). All of these gaseous materials cause harmful 
effects on the environment and contribute to the global climate change on earth. Cement alone  
contributes about 5% of the world’s total greenhouse gases (Adam, 2007 and Loreti Group, 
2008). Not only do these gases contribute to global warming, they also contribute to poor air 
quality  that  can  cause  weakening  in  human  health  and  respiratory  systems.  When  cement  
factories become even more concentrated in the developing world, this means that children and 
people living in these areas will be paying the price for construction firms to use the cement in 
Europe or North America (Miller, 2009). Hence, the global cement industry can be characterized 
as having global distributional inefficiency across space and time. 
  The environmental impact is further complicated through the harmful effects of resource 
depletion. In order to make cement and burn the components at the aforementioned temperature, 
the amount of fuel used –oil or coal—is very high. While clinker is not under the threat of being 
depleted anytime soon, the economic costs of fuel resource depletion needed to make the cement 
is under attack. Furthermore once the final product is produced, some solid wastes remain as a 
result  of  the  production  process.  Such  solid  waste,  in  countries  with  loose  environmental 
regulations  or  weak  enforcement  mechanisms,  is  thrown  into  the  water  or  burned  in  an 
uncontrolled location. This lack of oversight continues to cause levels  of inequality that the 
world cannot sustain in the long run. 
These environmental challenges have gone uncontrolled because of the importance of 
cement  for  developing  countries  due  to  industrialization,  export  proceeds,  and  infrastructure 
requirements. The industry traditionally has gone under the radar –unlike the aviation industry 
that has been under attack for environmental impact. It is worth to mention here that industry 
leaders have taken the lead, in real or artificial terms, to meet and discuss the impact of their 
industry  on  the  environment  (Adam,  2007).  Specifically,  the  World  Business  Council  for 
Sustainable Development (WBCSD) has started a Cement Sustainability Initiative (CSI) led by 
global industry firms. However, action has yet to take place in an organized and succinct manner 
that can prevent the long term environmental and health damage that is caused by the production 
of cement on a global scale. 
  The environmental challenges posed to the world are exacerbated because of the lack of 
substitutes for cement. Building hospitals, hotels, homes, schools, etc is a necessary component 
for development and infrastructure build up. Without cement, building is virtually impossible. 
However, according to the United States Geological Survey, ―virtually all Portland cement is 
used either in making concrete or mortars and, as such, competes in the construction sector with 
concrete substitutes such as aluminum, asphalt, clay brick, rammed earth, fiberglass, glass, steel, 
stone,  and  wood‖  (United  States  Geological  Survey,  2008).    In  other  words,  some  of  these 
materials can be utilized in higher proportions to decrease the use of concrete which has the 
effect of decreasing the use of cement. Actual cement substitutes are ―a number of materials, 
especially  fly  ash  and  ground  granulated  blast  furnace  slag,  which  develop  good  hydraulic 
cementitious  properties [the ability to  set  and harden under water by reacting with  the lime 
released by the hydration of Portland cement]. These (materials) are increasingly being used as 
partial substitutes for Portland cement in some concrete applications‖ (United States Geological 
Survey,  2008).  Any  framework  that  will  be  used  to  solve  the  environmental  problem  must balance the importance of continuing cement production for development with the heightened 
need to keep our environment safe for future generations.  
 
8. Applying Porter’s Five Forces: The Competitive Dimension 
To  begin  analyzing  different  frameworks  that  we  can  use  to  assess  solutions  for  the 
growing environmental impact of the cement industry and the market regulations needed, a better 
understanding about the forces that critically affect the industry must be distilled.  
Porter’s five forces provides a ―competitive forces‖ framework that allows us to better 
understand the different dimensions that govern market competition. Porter’s five forces are: (1) 
rivalry, (2) threat of substitutes, (3) buyer bargaining power, (4) supplier bargaining power, and 
(5) barriers to entry and exit (Porter, 2008). 
Rivalry within the cement industry is moderate. The structure of the market tends to be 
oligopolistic in different regions around the world. In other words only a few firms control the 
market in many different countries. This is due to the high fixed cost (approximately 10 million 
dollars a plant). This creates a highly concentrated firm environment with limited rivalry. On the 
other hand, cement products are not differentiated. This means that competition between existing 
firms can get intense. When consumers do not bare a cost by switching from one firm to another 
(low  switching  costs)  and  when  the  product  lacks  differentiation,  this  creates  a  haven  for 
competition and intense rivalry. The combination of the above factors result in moderate rivalry 
within the global cement industry. 
  The second force is the threat of substitutes. Lack of substitutes –other products that are 
not within the same industry but can be used instead—means that the industry does not face a 
credible threat of competition. This represents the reality of the cement industry. No product 
exists to date that can substitute effectively for cement. While construction firms can use less 
cement  in  exchange  for  using  other  materials  that  have  some  cementitious  quality,  that 
substitution effect is negligible on the market price of cement (United States Geological Survey, 
2008).  An  industry  is  only  threatened  if  another  industry  produces  a  similar  product  (e.g. 
aluminum cans vs. plastic bottles), or if consumers of that product can decrease the ratio of their 
use  of  that  product  and  use  another  product  i.e.  minimal  partial  substitution.  Both  of  these 
choices are virtually non-existent to cement consumers, hence the threat of substitutes is very 
low. 
  The  third  force  of  competition  is  buyer  bargaining  power.  This  refers  to  the  effect 
customers can exert on a particular industry. Pure buyer power exists when only one buyer exists 
in the market (monopsony). In this case power is entirely in the hands of the buyer. In the cement 
industry, facts suggest that this effect is minimal. The power of consumers is limited due to the 
lack of substitutes, the small number of cement firms (oligopoly), and the inelastic demand that 
consumers have for the product. Buyers are said to be powerful if they are highly concentrated, 
purchase a large amount of the product, or if there is product standardization. The last effect 
exists but its impact is weak because of persistent shortages in the cement market. Given the fact 
that the buyers in the cement market lack the characteristics that give them power over producing 
firms, the competitive level of the industry judged through this force is very low. Firms have an 
easier time setting price while buyers act generally as price takers. 
  Supplier bargaining power is the fourth force that Porter argues influences industries. 
Suppliers if powerful can extract some of the profits that producing firms are making off of 
consumers by raising the prices of raw materials. In the inputs market for the cement industry, 
suppliers are concentrated –but buyers are also concentrated. This means that initial bargaining is practically  on  equal  footing.  Suppliers  of  cement  industry  are  divided  into  two  categories: 
suppliers of transportation and suppliers of raw materials (clinkers). Cement manufacturers have 
argued  that  price  hikes  in  the  cement  industry  are  due  to  increases  in  the  price  of  both 
transportation and raw materials. This means that suppliers are powerful enough to force new 
prices on the cement industry. However, the weakness of the final consumers relative to both 
implies that the burden is mostly shifted to the price of the final product. In general suppliers are 
powerful if there is a credible forward integration threat (suppliers can buy producing firms), 
suppliers are concentrated (no switching opportunity), the cost is prohibitive to switch suppliers, 
and/or if a supplier can rally up the final consumer (such as fair trade farmers). In the case of 
cement the power of suppliers comes from their concentration regionally and from the high cost 
in switching between suppliers. It is not easy for a cement firm to buy clinker from China and 
ship it to Egypt or vice versa. This means that local raw material production must be utilized and 
that local or regional suppliers have high bargaining power. 
The final force that Porter uses to measure forces of competition within an industry is 
barriers to entry and exit. High barriers to entry mean that firms already in the industry do not 
fear  outside  competition.  This  means  that  rivalry  amongst  firms  is  not  ―intense‖.  In  fact, 
incentives for intra-industry cooperation in this case, or backhanded collusions such as cartels, 
are highly plausible. Barriers to exit on the other hand means that firms already in the market are 
―locked in‖. This can result from the firm’s inability to sell the assets if it decides to leave the 
industry. Barriers to entry and exit can be seen in four different ways. First, government creates 
barriers by limiting the number of licenses it sells for production. Cement is energy intensive as 
well as highly polluting; therefore entry to such a market has to be highly regulated in the eyes of 
many governments. Second, patents create entry barriers. Patents on new production methods or 
machines create difficulties for firms to enter. However, the cement industry is not a patent-
dependent  industry,  unlike  other  industries  such  as  pharmaceuticals.  Third,  assets  needed  to 
produce cement cannot be easily utilized for another industry (i.e. the cement industry is highly 
asset specific). This means that if a firm decides to enter into the market it must realize that a 
cease in its production will be very costly. Finally, economies of scale can prevent entry. For 
cement firms, neutralizing the high fixed costs requires a minimum efficient scale of production 
that creates a strong barrier to entry. Overall, the cement industry has high barriers to entry and 
high barriers to exit. 
Porter’s  five  forces  is  a  framework  that  looks  at  rivalry  and  consumer-firm-industry 
relations from a  ―market forces‖ perspective. In the case of cement it is clear that the final 
consumer has little say in the price because of the high inelastic demand. Production is very 
costly and regulated in most areas which keep rivalry in moderation. The power of suppliers of 
raw materials and cement firms forces the burden of price hikes to shift to the consumers. This 
conclusion must be taken into account when comparing Porter’s model with the institutional 
viewpoint, in order to come up with an effective framework to analyze policies related to the 
cement industry in general. 
Figure  1  depicts  the  five  competitive  forces  that  shape  the  global  cement  industry. 
Rivalry is moderate, the effect of substitutes is weak, buyer power is minimal, supplier power is 
high, and entry/exit barriers are both high. In essence, the vertical supply chain has pricing power 
over final consumers, whereas the horizontal dimension of competition is lacking due to lack of 
the  possibility  of  differentiated  advantages  in  production.  Inelastic  demand  neutralizes  the 
consumer power associated with product standardization, whereas proximity of raw materials to 
production sites generate regional cement clusters.     
Figure 1:  
The  Five Competitive Forces that  
Shape the Global Cement Industry 
The above diagram explains Porter’s five competitive forces as they relate to the global cement industry. A plus sign means that the force has an 
effect on the cement industry in intensifying rivalry. A minus sign means that it plays an opposing role. An (N) means that the force has neutral or 
no relevance to the industry. 9. The Institutional Economics Dimension 
The market niche is a newly developed concept by institutional economists and it refers 
to the segment of the market in which production supply meets with the highly inelastic portion 
of demand, the latter being elastic at price extremes. It is widened or narrowed through ―product 
innovation, advertising, (and) after sales services‖ (Kasper & Streit, 1998). In other words, it is 
that segment in a market which does not respond to little variation in pricing. Whether it is due to 
the necessity of the product or loyalty for the product, a niche is the single most important 
segment for which different firms try to compete. 
The consumers of Portland cement can be divided into three categories: governments, 
construction  firms,  and  individual  home  owners.  Assuming  a  downward  sloping  aggregate 
demand curve, individual home owners would be the consumers on the demand curve that are 
most elastic. Whether it is utilizing cement for repair or for home expansion, this segment will 
always respond to price changes. On the more inelastic portion of the curve lie the construction 
firms  and  the  government.  Government  projects  are  time  sensitive  and  generally  relate  to 
infrastructure  build  up.  This  means  that  sensitivity  to  price  is  almost  negligible  as  the  time 
constraint  of  project  implementation  dictate  the  government’s  consumption  of  cement. 
Construction firms will not respond to small changes in price but may respond if crashes (or 
shocks) occur in the housing market. However, the presence of the niche –government and big 
firms—means that the price of cement can be affected little by individual decisions. Pricing for 
the niche takes place separately than that for individual consumers because the impact of pricing 
is quite different. This differs than the generic pricing model in that the institutional framework 
(Kasper and Streit, 1998) applied to cement firms divides consumers into different sensitivity 
groups and shows that the demand curve is not fully uniform –but rather can be affected by 
different groups within the same market. Figure 2 depicts a typical market niche and shows how 
the demand curve can behave according to institutional economics. 
Understanding how pricing can be tailored to different consumers will help in shaping a 
framework to judge the regulation or deregulation of the cement industry. Having a strong hold 
on  the  market  niche  means  that  firms  in  the  cement  industry  will  respond  little  to  market 
mechanisms. Whether it be large subsidies from the government or guarantees of large projects, 
such activities lead to unintentional price fixing through institutional means. If cement firms 
were insecure with the niche –the fear that governments or buyers may switch to other firms—
then  cement  producers  would  be  more  sensitive  to  pricing  as  determined  by  the  market 
mechanism. 
In order for us to test the hypothesis of institutional economics as applied to the global 
cement industry, we decided to collect data on four countries: Thailand (second largest exporter), 
China (largest producer/exporter), France (European production center for cement), and Spain 
(second largest importing country but not on the top ten list of cement exporters). After selecting 
these countries we gathered data about their cement production in 3 different years 2006-2008 
for the former three and 2005-2007 for Spain (2008 data was not available). After collecting this 
data we calculated the (average) price elasticity for the different countries in real terms. Since we 
are examining demand elasticity we assumed that what this country exports constitutes what the 
world  effectively  demands  from  that  country–  given  that  all  of  what  is  exported  is  being 
consumed. Quantities used in the calculation were obtained from the UN Commodity Trade 
Statistics.  
Results show three different critical points of demand elasticity. Thailand’s average price 
elasticity of demand is 1.08 which means that demand for Thai cement is unitary elastic. Chinese 
and French cement, in contrast, are found to be highly inelastic at 0.10 and 0.14, respectively. 
Spanish cement is highly elastic at 4.44. Correlating these elasticities with real cement prices – 
which we call price points- we derive that the demand curve for cement within the institutional framework has a ―double-kink‖ as obtained from our calculations (see Figures 2 and 3). Thailand 
with the unitary elastic demand had the lowest price ($26 per metric ton) while Spain had the 
highest price ($141 per metric ton) and the highest elasticity. China and France respectively fell 
in the middle ($41 and $63) even though the demand for their cement proved to be inelastic. 
These  price  points  were  then  re-tested  (and  re-indexed)  with  US  cement  import/export  data 
found  from  the  United  States  Geological  Survey,  and  results  were  found  almost  fully 
conforming. The final result for the cement market niche argument, based on the institutional 
economics dimension, is shown in Figure 3. 
Based on the above calculations, it is implied that at the lowest price level ($26) the 
demand is unitary elastic and at the highest ($141) the demand is elastic. The middle range 
between  $41  and  $63  is  where  the  market  is  inelastic  –or  where  the  niche  lies.  Countries 
producing and exporting the highest quantities have the most inelastic portion of the demand 
curve almost fully covered. This is the market niche. 
If we draw this demand curve it will be easy to notice that the institutional proposal does 
not completely fit into the cement market data. The demand curve begins at low quantity and 
high price corresponding with a high elasticity and then as quantity grows (scale expands) we 
seem to enter the inelastic range and lower prices at the critical price of $63. The inelastic market 
niche  then  occurs  between  $41  and  $63.  Where  our  derived  curve  differs  from  that  of  the 
institutional economists is that at low prices (Thailand) quantity drops and the line becomes 
unitary elastic. In other words, unlike what institutional economists would suggest [i.e. that at the 
lowest portion of the curve quantity increases, price decreases and the demand is elastic], the 
findings seem to suggest that quantity and price drop together in the cement market data.  
  Some reasons for the discrepancy between the institutionalist demand curve and the one 
derived in this paper is probably due to the fact that there is a minimum quantity at which you 
will be considered a real player in the market (i.e. in the niche area). If unable to reach this 
minimum level, you are actually considered out of the market. This explains why any pricing 
outside  the  niche  correlates  with  low  quantity.  Furthermore,  players  outside  the  niche  price 
according  to  location  i.e.  there  exists    regional  price  differentiation  outside  the  niche.  This 
explains  why Asian pricing  is  different  than European pricing  even though both produce at 
similarly low quantities. For the market  niche  players, the relative price difference is  lower 
because market niche competition is more intense. This re-affirms that the institutional niche 



















































This graph shows the demand curve for an industry based on the institutional economics viewpoint. 
Note that demand sensitivity to price is not uniform: as price increases, quantity decreases significantly 
(approaching the niche), then becomes more inelastic (market niche area), then decreases significantly 
again (moving away from the niche). The demand curve is elastic at the top and bottom and inelastic in 
the middle. This middle area represents the market niche (Kasper and Streit, 1998).  










This graph represents the derived demand of the global cement industry based on the institutionalist viewpoint.  This is 
in contrast to the generalist institutional economics graph in Figure 2. From top to bottom, the first segment represents 
the high price low quantity elastic portion of the demand curve with a price range from $141/ton to $63/ton. The 
second segment between prices of $63 and $41 represents the inelastic market niche segment of the market. The third 
segment represents unitary elasticity with a low quantity low price range between $26/ton and $41/ton. The fourth 

















10. Effective Regulatory Control: A Call for a Proposal  
It is evident that Porter’s competitive forces and the institutional economics framework 
do not independently offer a holistic picture of the global cement industry. Hence, each approach 
on its own cannot be used as a policy evaluation tool for effective regulation of the market. 
Porter’s  five  forces  do  not  fully  explain  the  inner  workings  of  the  market  except  from  a 
rationality standpoint. The changing role of government and environmental groups is not directly 
assessed. Moreover, the involvement of exogenous players outside the industrial supply chain- or 
even behind the scene shifting instruments - are not fully accounted for. On the other hand, the 
institutional economics framework explains segmented demand behavior in the market pricing 
mechanism but cannot on its own account for the rational forces of competition which led to 
such price variations. Therefore, we propose that both dimensions be taken together in order to 
efficiently manage the interaction between global players in the industry and create an effective 
regulatory policy framework to monitor the growing global cement market.  
The cement industry is a crucial industry for infra-structure buildup which is necessary 
for economic growth. Left unchecked however it can cause detrimental long run sustainability 
problems:  impact  on  climate  change,  health  hazards,  as  well  as  excessive  energy  resource 
depletion. As stated in our introduction, any solution to the cement industry must have a global 
enforcing  mechanism.  Any  local  solution  to  the  problem  will  not  work  on  its  own.  As  an 
example,  when  the  European  Union  restricted  cement  production  in  order  to  protect  the 
environment,  major  firms  just  shifted  their  production  sites  to  developing  countries  (Hardy, 
2008). In addition, governments in the developing world cannot be the only regulatory body over 
the cement industry firms. Due to the necessity of the product, firms have a major bargaining 
power against most governments. Also, hidden transaction costs can cause a slow down in the 
enforcement of laws and regulations designed to protect the sustainability of the global industry. 
The insurance of fair competition practices across borders is also necessary to curb predatory 
oligopolistic behavior in the cement industry. Big business can easily take advantage of the lack 
of fair competition laws that may exist in developing countries (Miller, 2009). In a high barrier 
industry that is not very closely monitored, the room for cartel behavior – such as the recent case 
found in  Egypt—  is  readily observed (Mishkin, 2007). Without  appropriate fair  competition 
mechanisms, businesses can easily collude and engage in behavior contrary to fair consumer 
rights and to efficient long run resource sustainability (Hardy, 2008).  
Since the cement industry cannot be left unchecked and unregulated on the global scale, 
we propose that the option of cooperative regulation must be explored. Specifically, one of the 
solutions  that  we  strongly  believe  warrants  examination  is  the  creation  of  an  international 
regulatory  body  for  the  cement  industry.  This  body  should  be  composed  of  international 
representatives  from:  (1)  cement  firms  (business),  (2)  cement  associations 
(independent/business),  (3)  real  estate  and  construction  groups  (business/government),  (4) 
consumer  rights  groups  (independent/government), (5)  environmental  agencies  (government), 
and  (6)  environmentalist  groups  (independent).  Establishing  an  interactive  platform  with  the 
objective  of  continuous  communication  between  the  above  stakeholders  will  generate 
enforcement mechanisms  that tackle  critical  regulatory  issues  pertinent  to  the global  cement 
industry.  Among  such  critical  issues  would  be  consumer  protection,  competition  policy, 
institutional governance, environmental pollution, and fair market practices.  
The inner workings of the proposed regulatory body need to be examined in a separate 
research  undertaking.  However,  in  this  paper  we  have  provided  the  necessary  tools  for 
understanding  significant  economic  dimensions  in  the  global  cement  industry  from  the 
competitive and market niche viewpoints.  
  
11. Conclusion  
It is fundamental for governments and cement firms alike to recognize the importance of 
finding a coordinated international approach that can direct the global cement industry towards 
both  economic  efficiency  and environmental compliance. Policy  makers  need to realize that 
there are three specific forces, with corresponding effects, that actually govern this interesting 
but peculiar market. These are summarized below in Table 4. 
 
 Table 4: Critical Forces Governing the International Cement Market 
Force  Effect 
(1) Absolute Cost advantage  Prevents new firms from entering because 
incumbent multinationals control such an 
advantage 
(2) Substitutability  Keeps the power of the buyer (consumer) weak 
relative to cement firms reinforcing the above 
advantage 
(3) Industry Concentration  Curbs rivalry providing a haven to back handed 
collusion in the local governance structure of the 
industry and creates competition compliance 
concerns   
 
In order to keep the power of cement firms in check and sustain economic and natural 
resources for future generations, governments and different stakeholder groups must organize 
themselves into an international regulatory body. This body should be comprised of consumer 
rights  groups,  environmentalist  groups,  independent  cement  associations,  cement  businesses, 
related industries, and policy representatives from different governments. The bottom line of 
such an organization is to design regulatory frameworks in order to reach a sustainable level of 
industry  development  within  a  global  context.  In  essence,  current  local  asymmetries  in 
governance  and  structure  within  the  cement  industry  should  be  neutralized,  or  at  least 
coordinated, on a global scale. 
This paper calls for a concrete proposal to address global enforcement mechanisms for 
effective regulatory control over the global cement industry. A proposed body will act as an 
effective  oversight  system  where  corruption  can  happen  and  collusion  may  occur.  The 
development  of  the  global  cement  industry  is  necessary  in  so  far  as  it  provides  the 
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